The study of belief change has been an active area in philosophy and AI. In recent years, two special cases of belief change, belief revision and belief update, have been studied in detail. Roughly speaking, revision treats a surprising observation as a sign that previous beliefs were wrong, while update treats a surprising observation as an indi cation that the world has changed. In general, we would expect that an agent making an observa tion may both want to revise some earlier beliefs and assume that some change has occurred in the world. We define a novel approach to be lief change that allows us to do this, by apply ing ideas from probability theory in a qualitative settings. The key idea is to use a qualitative Markov assumption, which says that state tran sitions are independent We show that a recent approach to modeling qualitative uncertainty us ing plausibility measures allows us to make such a qualitative Markov assumption in a relatively straightforward way, and show how the Markov assumption can be used to provide an attractive belief-change model.
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INTRODUCTION
The question of how an agent should change his beliefs after making an observation or performing an action has attracted a great deal of recent attention. There are two proposals that have received perhaps the most attention: belief revision [Alchourr6n, Gardenfors, and Makinson 1985; Gardenfors 1988 ] and belief update [Katsuno and Mendelzon 1991] .
Belief revision focuses on how an agent changes his be liefs when he acquires new information; belief update, on the other hand, focuses on how an agent should change his beliefs when he realizes that the world has changed. Both approaches attempt to capture the intuition that to accommodate a new belief, an agent should make mini mal changes. The difference between the two approaches comes out most clearly when we consider what happens when an agent observes something that is inconsistent with his previous beliefs. Revision treats the new observation as an indication that some of the previous beliefs were wrong and should be discarded. It tries to choose the most plausi ble beliefs that can accommodate the observation. Update, on the other hand, assumes that the previous beliefs were correct, and that the observation is an indication that a change occurred in the world. It then tries to find the most plausible change that accounts for the observation and to predict what else has changed as a result
In general, we would expect that an agent making an ob servation may want both to revise some earlier beliefs and to assume that some change has occurred in the world. To see this, consider the following example (which is a variant of Kautz's stolen car example [ 1986] , and closely resem bles the borrowed-car example in [Friedman and Halpern 1994b] ): A car is parked with a full fuel tank at time 0; at time 2, the owner returns to find it parked where he left it. If the owner believes that parked cars tend to stay put, then he would believe that no changes occurred between time 0 and 2. What should he believe when, at time 3, he discovers that the fuel tank is empty? Update treats this observation as an indication of a change between time 2 and 3, for exam ple, a gas leak. Revision, on the other hand, treats it as an indication that previous beliefs, such as the belief that the tank was full at time 2, were wrong . In practice, the agent may want to consider a number of possible explanations for his time-3 observation, depending on what he considers to be the most likely sequence(s) of events between time 0 and time 3. For example, if he has had previous gas leaks, then he may consider a gas leak to be the most plausible explanation. On the other hand, if his wife also has the car keys, he may consider it possible that she used the car in his absence. Is there a reasonable approach that lets us capture these considerations in a natural manner? In this paper, we show that there is and, indeed, we can get one by applying straightforward ideas from probability theory in a qualitative setting.
To understand our approach, it is helpful to review what a probabilist would do. The first step is to get an appropriate model of the situation. As was argued in [Friedman and Halpern 1995a; Friedman and Halpern 1994b] , to capture belief change appropriately, we need a model of how the system changes over time. We assume that at each point in time, the system is in some state. A run of the system is a function from time (which we assume ranges over the natural numbers) to states; thus, a run is essentially a sequence of states. A run can be thought of as a description of how the system changes over time. We identify a system with a set of runs. Intuitively, we are identifying the system with its possible behaviors.
The standard probabilistic approach would be to put a prob ability on the runs of the system. This is the agent's prior probability, and captures his initial beliefs about the relative likelihood of runs. As the agent receives information, he changes his beliefs using conditioning.
One obvious problem with this approach is that, even if there are only two possible states, there are uncountably many possible runs. How can an agent describe a prior probability over such a complex space? The standard so lution to this problem is to assume that state transitions are independent of when they occur, that is, that the probability of the system going from state s to state s' is indepen dent of the sequence of transitions that brought the system to state s. This Markov assumption significantly reduces the complexity of the problem. All that is necessary is to describe the probability of state transitions. Moreover, the Markov assumption has been shown to be widely applicable in practice [Kemeny and Snell 1960; Howard 1971) .
Another problem with a straightforward use of probability is that, in many situations, an agent may not know the ex act probability of various state transitions, although he may have some more qualitative information about them. In the literature, there are many approaches to representing quali tative beliefs: preferential structures [Kraus, Lehmann, and Magidor 1990] , possibilistic measures [Dubois and Prade 1990] , 11:-rankings [Spohn 1988; Goldszmidt and Pearl 1992] , and logics of extreme probabilities [Pearll989]. We represent beliefs here using plausibility measures [Fried man and Halpern 1995b] , an approach that generalizes all the earlier approaches. A plausibility measure is a quali tative analogue of a probability measure; it associates with every event its plausibility, which is just an element in a partially ordered space.
As shown in [Friedman and Halpern 1995a] , we can de fine a natural notion of belief using plausibility, where a proposition is believed exactly if it is more plausible than its complement. It is also easy to define a notion of con ditioning in plausibility spaces (as done in [Friedman and Halpern 1995b) ). Once we apply conditioning to the notion of belief, we get a notion of belief change. Interestingly, it can be shown that belief revision and belief update both can be viewed as instances of such belief change [Friedman and Halpern 1994b] . That is, we can get belief revision and belief update when we condition on the appropriate plausi bility measures. Not surprisingly, the plausibility measures that capture belief revision are ones that consider plausible only runs where the world never changes over time. On the other hand, the plausibility measures that capture belief up date are ones that make plausible those runs in which, in a precise sense, abnormalities are deferred as late as possible.
The plausibility measures that give us belief revision and belief update are fairly special, and do not capture many typical situations. We would like to specify a prior plausibility measure over runs that captures our initial assessment of the relative plausibility of runs. As in the probabilistic settings, such a prior can be quite complex. We can use (a qualitative analogue of) the Markov assumption to simplify the description of the prior plausibility.
Making a (qualitative) Markov assumption gives us a well behaved notion of belief change, without making the occa sionally unreasonable assumptions made by belief revision and update. In particular, it allows a user to weigh the rela tive plausibility that a given observation is due to a change in the world or due to an inaccuracy in previous beliefs . In the car example, this means that the agent can decide the relative plausibility of a gas leak and his wife's taking the car, without making the commitment to one or the other, as required by update and revision. This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we re view the probabilistic approach. Then, in Section 3, we review the definition of plausibility and discuss conditional plausibility. In Section 4, we introduce Markovian plausi bility measures and show how they can be used to induce an interesting notion of belief change. In Section 5, we exam ine the situation where the user is willing only to compare the plausibility of transitions, without committing to their magnitude. We characterize what beliefs follow from such a partial specification. In Section 6, we compare our ap proach to others in the literature. We end with a discussion of these results and directions of future research in Sec tion 7.
PROBABILISTIC BELIEF CHANGE
To reason about a space W probabilistically, we need a probability measure on W. Formally, that means we have a probability space (W, F, Pr), where F is an algebra of measurable subsets of W (that is, a set of subsets closed under union and complementation, to which we assign probability) function mapping each event (i.e., a subset of W) in F to a number in [0, 1] , satisfying the well known Kolmogorov axioms (Pr(0) = 0, Pr(W) = 1, and Pr(A U B) = Pr(A) + Pr(B) if A and Bare disjoint).' Probability theory also dictates how we should change our beliefs. If the agent acquires evidence E, his beliefs af ter learning E are specified by the conditional probability Pr(-IE). Note that by using conditioning, we are implic itly assuming that the information E is correct (since we assign E-the complement of E-probability 0), and that discovering E is telling us only that E is impossible; the relative probability of subsets of E is the same before and after conditioning.
We want to reason about a dynamical ly changing system.
To do so, we need to identify the appropriate space W and the events of interest (i.e., F). We assume that the system changes in discrete steps, and that after each step, the system is in some state. We denoted by S the set of possible states of the system. As we said in the introduction, a run is a function from the natural numbers to states. Thus, a run r describes a particular execution that goes through the sequence of states r(O), r( 1), .... We identify a system with a set of runs, and take W to consist of these runs.
There are various events that will be of interest to us; we always assume without comment that the events of interest are in F. One type of event of interest is denoted S; = s; this is the set of runs r such that r(i) = s.2 A time-n event is a Boolean combination of events of the form S; = s, for i :::; n. We are particularly interested in time-n events of the form (So= so) n · · -n(Sn = sn), which we abbreviate [so, ... , Sn]; this is the set of all runs in W with initial prefix so, . . . , sn. We call such an event an n-prejix. Note that any time-n event is a union of n-prefixes.
As discussed in the introduction, describing a distribution Pr on runs can be difficult. Even when S contains only two states, W is uncountable. In the probabilistic litera ture, this difficulty is often dealt with by making a Markov assumption .
Definition 2.1: A Markov chain [Kemeny and Snelll960] over S1, Sz, ... is a measure Pr on W that satisfies
, where E is any time-n event,
We say that Pr is a Markovian measure if it is a Markov chain over So, St, .... I
The first requirement states that the probability of Sn + 1 = sn+t is independent of preceding states given the value of Sn: The probability of going from state Sn = Sn to Sn+t = sn+l is independent of how the system reached S, = Sn. The second requirement is that the transition probabilities, i.e., the probabilities of transition from states to states', do not depend on the time of the transition. Many systems can be modeled so as to make both assumptions applicable.
If we assume that the system has a unique initial state s0 (that is, r(O) = s0 for all runs ,. E W), and specify transition probabilities p,,,,, with I:,'ES p,,,, = 1, for each s E S, then it is easy to show that there is a unique Markovian measure Pr on the algebra generated by events of the form sj = s such that Pr(Sn+l = s'IS n = s) = P•.
•'· We can define Pr on then-prefixes by induction on n. Obvious analogues of our results hold even without this assumption.
PLAUSIBILITY MEASURES
Our aim is to find analogues of probabilistic belief change in situations where we do not have numeric probabilities. We do so by using notion of a plausibility space, which is a natural generalization of probability space [Friedman and Halpern 1995b ] . We simply replace the probability measure Pr by a plausibility measure PI, which, rather than mapping sets in F to numbers in [0, 1], maps them to elements in some arbitrary partially ordered set. We read PI( A) as "the plausibility of set A". If PI( A) s PI( B), then B is at least as plausible as A . Formally, a plausibility space is a tuple S = (W, :F, D, PI), where W is a set of worlds, F is an algebra of subsets of W, Dis a domain of plausibility values partially ordered by a relation :::; n (so that :::; n is reflexive, transitive, and anti-symmetric), and PI maps the sets in F to D. We assume that Dis pointed: that is, it contains two special elements T n and l.n such that l.n:::; n d :::; n T D for all d E D; we further assume that Pl(W ) = T D and Pl(0) =l.n. The only other assumption we make is
Al. If A� B, then Pl(A):::; PI( B).
Thus, a set must be at least as plausible as any of its subsets. As usual, we define the ordering <n by taking dt <n d2 if d1 Sn d2 and d1 f:. d2. We omit the subscript D from :::; n, <n, T n, and ..Ln whenever it is clear from context.
Clearly plausibility spaces generalize probability spaces. They also are easily seen to generalize Dempster-Shafer belief functions [Shafer 1976 ] and fuzzy measures [Wang and Klir 1992] , including possibility measures [Dubois and Prade 1990] . Of more interest to us here is another approach that they generalize: An ordinal ranking (or li-ranking) on W (as defined by [Goldszmidt and Pearl 1992] , based on ideas that go back to [Spohn 1988] ) is a function,.,; : 2 w -+ IN*, where IN* = IN U { oo}, such that !i(W) = 0, !i(0) = <X>, and !i(A) = minaEA !i( {a}) if A f:. 0. Intuitively, an ordinal ranking assigns a degree of surprise to each subset of worlds in W, where 0 means unsurprising, and higher numbers denote greater surprise. Again, it is easy to see that if,.,; is a ranking on W, then (W, IN*, K) is a plausibility space, where x sIN· y if and only if y :::; x under the usual ordering on the ordinals.
Conditioning plays a central role in probabilistic belief change. In [Friedman and Halpern 1995b] , we define an analogue of conditioning for plausibility. Just as a con ditional probability measure associates with each pair of sets A and B a number, Pr(AjB), a conditional plausi bility measure associates with pairs of sets a conditional plausibility. Formally, a conditional plausibility measure maps maps a pair of sets A and B to a plausibility, usually denoted Pl(AjB), where for each fixed B -::f-0, PI( ·JB) is a plausibility measure, satisfying a coherence condi tion described below. A conditional plausibility space is a tuple (W, F, D, PI), where PI is a conditional plausibil ity measure. In keeping with standard practice in prob ability theory, we also write PI( A, BJD, E) rather than PI( An BID n E). The coherence condition is C l captures the relevant aspects of probabilistic condition ing: after conditioning by C, the plausibility of sets that are disjoint from C becomes _1_, and the relative plausibility of sets that are subsets of C does not change.
As we mentioned in the introduction, we are interested here in plausibility measures that capture certain aspects of qualitative reasoning. We say that an event A is believed
given evidence E according to plausibility measure PI if
A is more plausible than its complement when E is true. Notice that, by Cl, this is equivalent to saying that Pl(AjE) > Pl(AjE). Moreover, note that if Pl is a probability function, this just says that Pr(AjE) is greater than 1/2. Probabilistic beliefs defined this way are, in general, not closed under conjunction. We may believe A and believe A' without believing A n A'.
In [Friedman and Halpern 1996] , we show that a necessary and sufficient condition for an agent's beliefs to be closed under conjunction is that the plausibility measure satisfies the following condition:
A2. If A, B, and C are pairwise disjoint sets, PI(
Plausibility measures that satisfy A2 are called qualitative.3
We can now state precisely the property captured by A2.
Given a plausibility measure PI, let BelpJ (E) = {A :
We then have:
Theorem 3.1: [Friedman and Halpern 1996] 4 PI is a qual itative plausibility measure if and only if, for all events A B, and E. if A, B E Belp1(E) then An BE BelpJ(E).
3 Jn [Friedman and Halpern 1996], we also assumed that qualitative plausibility measures had an additional property: if It is easy to show that possibility measures and ��:-rankings define qualitative plausibility spaces. In addition, as we show in [Friedman and Halpern 1996] , preferential or derings [Kraus, Lehmann, and Magidor 1990] , and PPDs (parameterized probability distributions, which are used in defi ning t-semantics [Pearl 1989 ]) can be embedded into qualitative plausibility spaces. On the other hand, proba bility measures and Dempster-Shafer belief functions are in general not qualitative. Since our interest here is in qualita tive reasoning, we focus on qualitative plausibility spaces (although some of our constructions hold for arbitrary plau sibility measures).
Using qualitative (conditional) plausibility spaces we can model belief change in dynamic systems. Both revision and update are concerned with beliefs about the current state of the world. We follow this tradition, although most of our results also apply to richer languages (which allow, for example, beliefs about past and future states). Suppose (W, F, D, PI) is a plausibility space, where W is a system consisting of all the runs over some state space S. Infor mally, we want to think of a language that makes statements about states. That means that each formula in such a lan guage can be identified with a set of states. In particular, a proposition (set of states) A in such a language is true at time n in a run r if r(n) E A. Using the notion of belief defined earlier, A is believed to be true at time n if the plausibility of the set of runs where A is true at time n is greater than the plausibility of the set of runs where it is false. To make this precise, if A is a set of states, let A( n ) = {r E W: r (n) E A}. Thus, A( n ) is the set of runs where A is true at time n. Then we define
We can think of BeFp1( E) as characterizing the agent's be liefs about the state of the world at time n, given evidence E. (We omit the subscript PI from BeL;; 1 whenever it is clear from the context.)
This construction-which essentially starts with a prior on runs and updates it by conditioning in the light of new information-is analogous to the probabilistic approach for handling observations.
We can also relate our approach to the more standard ap proaches to belief change [Alchourr6n, Gardenfors, and Makinson 1985; Katsuno and Mendelzon 1991] . In these approaches, it is assumed that an agent has a belief set K, consisting of a set of formulas that he believes. J{ * A represents the agent's belief set after observing A. We can think of Bel 0 (S) as characterizing the agent's initial belief set J{. For each proposition A, we can identify Bell (A) with ]{ * A. In this framework, we can also do iterated change: Beln(A\ ') 1\ ... 1\ A�n)) is the agent's belief state after observing A1, then A2, . . . , and then An.
As we have shown in previous work [1995a, 1994b] , condi tioning captures the intuition of minimal change that under lies most approaches to belief change. In particular, both belief revision and belief update can be viewed as instances of conditioning on the appropriate prior. As expected, the prior plausibility measures that correspond to revision as-sign plausibility only to runs where the system does not change, but are fairly unstructured in other respects. On the other hand, the prior plausibility measures that correspond to update allow the system to change states, but put other constraints on how change can occur. Roughly speaking, they prefer runs where surprising events occur as late as possible.
MARKOVIAN BELIEF CHANGE
As we said in the introduction, we would like a notion of belief change that allows us both to revise our previous beliefs about the world and to allow for a change in the world occurring. Moreover, we need to address the question of representing the plausibility measure on runs. Can we get measures with reasonable belief-change properties that can be represented in a natural and compact manner? In the probabilistic framework, the Markov assumption provides a solution to both problems. As we now show, it is also useful in the plausibilistic setting. Pl. Given a Markovian plausibility space (W, :F, D, PI), we define the transition plausibilities analogously to the transi tion plausibilities: that is, t,,,, = Pl(Sn+i = s' I Sn = s).
In the probabilistic setting, the Markov assumption has many implications that can be exploited. In particular, we can easily show the existence and uniqueness of a Marko vian prior with a given set of transition probabilities. Can we get a similar result for Markovian plausibility spaces? In general, the answer is no. To get this property, and the other desirable properties of Markovian plausibility spaces, we need to put more structure on plausibility measures.
In showing that there is a unique Markovian measure de termined by the transition probabilities, we made use of two important properties of probability: The first is that (This was used to get the probability of an arbitrary time n event from the probability of the time-n prefixes.) We would like to have analogues of+ and x for plausibility.
To get an analogue of +, we need to assume that the plausi bility of the union of two disjoint sets A and B is a function of the plausibility of A and the plausibility of B. From now on we assume that that Markovian plausibility spaces are structured. In the probabilistic setting, Marko vian priors are useful in part because they can be described in a compact way. Similar arguments show that this is the case in the plausibilistic setting as well. Proof: (Sketch) Define PI so that
It is straightforward to show, using the properties of EB and @, that PI is uniquely defined. I
Since we want to capture belief, we are particularly inter ested in qualitative plausibility spaces. Thus, it is of interest to identify when this construction results in a qualitative plausibility measure. It turns out that when the domain is totally ordered, we can ensure that the plausibility measure is qualitative by requiring EB to be max.
5For possibility, ('R., max, min) is often used; this is not quite an algebraic domain, since min is not strictly monotonic. How ever, all our results but one-Theorem 5.3-holds as long as Q9 is monotonic, even if it is not strictly monotonic. It remains an open question to find natural sufficient condi tions to guarantee that the plausibility space of Theorem 4.1 is qualitative when Dis only partially ordered.
We now have the tools to use the Markov assumption in belief change. To illustrate these notions, we examine how we would formalize Kautz's stolen car example [1986] and the variant discussed in the introduction.
Example 4.3: Recall that in the original story, the car is parked at time 0 and at time 3 the owner returns to find it gone. In the variant, the car is parked with a full fuel tank at time 0, at time 2 the owner returns to find it parked where he left it, but at time 3 he observes that the fuel tank is empty. To model these examples we assume there are three states: Bpe , Bpe, and sp-e. In Bpe• the car is parked with a full tank; in Bpe• the car is parked with an empty tank; and in sp-e the car is not parked and the tank is full. We consider two propositions: Parked= {spe-, spe} and Full= {spe-. s � }-In the original story, the evidence at time 3 is captured by Estolen = Parked( D) n Fulf0) n Parkei3), since Parked il Full is observed at time 0, and Parked is observed at time 3. Similarly, the evidence in the variant at time 2 is captured by E �orrowed = Parked( D) il Fulf0) il Parked(z), and at time 3 by E�o rr owed = E� orrowed n Parked(3) n FutP ) .
We now examine one possible Markovian prior for this system. The story suggests that the most likely transitions are the ones where no change occurs. Suppose we attempt to capture this using 11:-rankings. Recall that ��:-rankings are based on the algebraic domain {IN*, min, +}. We could, for example, take t, -. _ = ta pe • pe = t,_ •-= 0. As this example shows, using qualitative Markovian plausi bilities, the agent can revise earlier beliefs as revision does (for example, the agent may revise his beliefs regarding whether the car was parked at time 1 once he sees that the fuel tank is no longer full), or he may think that a change occurred in the world that explains his current beliefs (the gas tank leaked). Of course, the agent might also consider both explanations to be likely.
It is interesting to compare the behavior of Markovian plau sibility measures in this example to that of Katsuno and
Mendelzon's update [1991] . As Kautz [1986] noted, given Estolen, we should believe that the car was stolen during the period we were gone, but should not have more spe cific beliefs. Markovian measures give us precisely this conclusion. Update, on the other hand, leads us to believe that the car was stolen just before we notice that it is gone [Friedman and Halpern 1994b] . To see this, note that any observation that is implied by the agent's current beliefs does not change those beliefs (this is one of Katsuno and Mendelzon's postulates). Combined with the fact that up date never revises beliefs about the past, we must conclude that the agent believes that the car was not stolen at time 1 or 2. In the second variant, the differences are even more significant. Using update, we conclude that there was a gas leak. Update cannot reach the conclusion that the car was borrowed, since that involves changing beliefs about the past: For the agent to consider it possible at time 3 that the car was borrowed, he has to change his belief that the car was parked at time 2. Moreover, update does not allow us to compare the relative plausibility of a gas leak to that of the car being borrowed. (See [Friedman and Halpern 1994b] for further discussion of update's behavior in this example.)
This discussion shows that Markovian priors are useful for representing plausibility measures compactly. Moreover, they give the user the right level of control: by setting the transition plausibilities, the user can encode his pref erence regarding various explanations. Markovian priors have computational advantages as well, as we now show.
Given ® and the transition plausibilities, the Markov as sumption allows us to compute the plausibilities of every n-prefix; then using E£1, we can compute whether an event A is in Bel�1(E). When n is large, this procedure is un reasonable. We do not want to examine all n-prefixes in order to evaluate our beliefs about time n. Fortunately, the Markov assumption allows us to maintain our beliefs about the current state of the system in an efficient way.
Suppose that the agent makes a sequence of observations 01 , 02, . . .. Each observation is a proposition (i.e., a set of states). The evidence at time n is simply the accumulated evidence: E., = op l n ... n O�"l. We are inter ested in testing whether A( n ) E Bel�1 (En)· According to Cl, this is equivalent to testing whether PI(A(n), En ) > Pl(A( n ) , En )·
It is easy to see that the plausibilities Pl(Sn = s, En), s E S, suffice for determining whether the agent believes A. This follows from the observation that Pl(A(n), En )= EBs EA P J(Sn = S, En ),
and similarly for Pl(;[ n l , E.,).
In addition, it is straightforward for an agent who has the plausibilities PI(Sn = s, E n ), s E S, to update them when he makes a new observation. To see this, observe that Pl(Sn+I = s, En+I) = Pl(Sn+I = s, En , O��i 1 l).
Thus, PI(Sn+I = s, En+I) = l_ if sf/_ On +I; otherwise, it is Pl(Sn+I = s, En ). In algebraic domains, we can com pute the latter plausibility using much the same techniques as in probabilistic domains:
Pl(Sn+I = s n En ) EBs 'Es Pl(Sn +I == siSn = s', En ) @Pl(Sn = 81 , E.,)
Using the Markov assumption, PI(Sn+l = siSn = s ' , En ) = PI(Sn+! == siSn = s') = t, ',•· Thus, we can compute PI(Sn+I = s, En+I) using Pl(Sn = s1 , En ) and the transition plausibilities t, , ,s .
To summarize, there is a simple two-stage procedure for up dating beliefs given new observations. In the first stage, we compute the plausibility of the current states using our be liefs about the previous state. In the second stage, we prune states that are inconsistent with the current observation.
Again, it is interesting to compare this approach to Katsuno and Mendelzon's belief update. One of the assumptions made by update is that the agent maintains only his beliefs about the current state of the system. Roughly speaking, this amounts to tracking only the states of the system that have maximal plausibility given past observations. Thus, update can require less information to update beliefs. This, how ever, comes at the price of assuming that abnormalities are delayed as much as possible. This, as we saw in the case of the borrowed car example, may lead to unintuitive conclu sions. We conjecture that to avoid such conclusions, agent must keep track of either information about past events or degrees of plausibilities of all possible states of the system at the current time.
Characterizing Markovian Belief Change
Our formalization of belief change is quite different from most in the literature. Most approaches to belief change start with a collection of postulates, argue that they are rea sonable, and prove some consequences of these postulates.
Occasionally, a semantic model for the postulates is pro vided and a representation theorem is proved (of the form that every semantic model corresponds to some belief revi sion process, and that every belief revision process can be captured by some semantic model).
We 
(E).
We now define two classes of structures. Let pQPL consist of all qualitative plausibility structures, and let pQ PL , M consist of all qualitative plausibility structures with a Markovian plausibility measure. Since pQPL, M c pQPL , any formula valid in pQP L (that is, true in every � lausibil ity structure in pQPL ) must also be valid in pQ L , M . As we now show, the converse holds as well. { {s1 , ... , sm ) SJ , ... ,S m E S, m � n} and 71'1((sJ, ... , sm )) ?l'(sm). We can then construct a Markovian plausi bility measure over W' that simulates PI up to time n, in that PI'([{so) , (so, si), ... , (so, s i , ... , s m)]) Pl([so, SJ , . . . , sm]) for all m :::; n. I It follows from Theorem 4.4 that for any Markovian plau sibility structure PL1, there is a non-Markovian plausibility structure PL2 such that, for every sequence \OJ , . . . , 'Pn of observations in £, the agent has the same beliefs (in the language £) after observing r.p1 , ..• , 'Pn· no matter whether his plausibility is characterized by PL 1 or PL2 • Thus, there are no special postulates for Markovian belief change over and above the postulates that hold for any approach to belief change.
PA RTIALLY SPECIFIED TRANSITIONS
Up to now, we have implicitly assumed that when the user specifies transition plausibilities, he has some underlying algebraic domain in mind. This assumption is quite strong, since it assumes that the user knows the exact plausibility value of the transitions, and the functions @ and E£1 that relate them.
In this section, we fo cus on situations where the user only specifies a partial order on transitions. This is a natural form of knowledge that can be specified/assessed in a relatively straightforward manner. Given a set S of states, consider transition variables of the fo rm x, , ,,, for s, s' E S. We think of x, ,•' as a variable representing the plausibility of the transition from s to s'. Assume that we are given constraints on these transition variables, specified by a par tial order :=;1 on the variables, together with constraints of the form x• , •' :=;1 .l.6 These can be thought of as con straints on the relative plausibility of transitions, together with constraints saying that some transitions are impossi ble. Xs,s' = .l. We are interested in plausibility measures that are consistent with sets of such constraints.
We say that a set C of constraints is safe if there is no vari able y and state s such that the x, ,, , <1 y is in C for all s' E S. There is no qualitative plausibility measure that sat isfies an unsafe set of constraints. To see this, note that, for a given s, t,,,, represent the plausibilities of disjoint events for different choices of s' . If we are dealing with qualita tive plausibility, if t,,,, < t for all s ' , then ffis 'ESts , s ' < t. However, we also have ffis 'Ests,s' = T, and we cannot have t > T. Thus, no qualitative plausibility measure can satisfy an unsafe set of constrai nts. However, any safe set set of constraints is satisfiable.
Theorem 5.1: Given a safe set C of constraints on the transitions over S as above, there is a qualitative Markovian plausibility space (W, F, D, PI) consistent with C.
Note that this theorem guarantees the existence of a quali tative prior. Unlike the situation described in the previous section, where transition plausibilities were fully specified, there is not in general a unique (qualitative) plausibility measure PI consistent with :=;1. This is due to the fact that x' re · ' re =t x,pe•'pe =t Xs pe , s pe · One way of satisfy ing these constraints is by using the standard x:-ranking described in Example 4.3, for which we have t, re , •pe = 3, t, _ •-= t,_ s pe = 1, and t, 3 = 0 for all states s. If PI pe• pe pe • ' 6 0f course, we take x =t y to be an abbreviation for x :::; , y and y :::; 1 x, and x < t y to be an abbreviation for x ::; ty and not(y ::; , x).
is the plausibility fu nction generated by this x:-ranking, we Constraints on the relative order of transition plausibilities do give rise to some constraints on the relative plausibility of n-prefi xes. It is these constraints that we now study.
We start with some notation. Let C be a safe set of con straints on transition variables, and let PI be a Markovian measure consistent with these constraints. As we observed, Pl([so, ... We define -< and R: using :::S in the standard manner. If [so, s1 , . . . , sn] MAY' (E) is the event defined as the union of n-prefixes in E that are maximal according to --<. It easily fo llows from axiom A2 that in any qualitative Markovian measure consistent with S:1 , the plausibility of MAX" (E) given E is greater than the plausibility of MAX' (E) given E. As a consequence, we have the fo llowing result.
Theorem 5.6: Suppose PI is a qualitative Markovian mea sure consistent with some set C of constraints, E is a time-n event, and A � S. If MAX' (E) � A(n ), then A E Beln (E).
Thus, by examining the most plausible (according to �) n-prefixes, we get a sufficient condition for a set A to be believed. The converse to Theorem 5.6 does not hold: the agent might believe A even if some of the n-prefixes are not in A (n ). However, the n-prefixes in MAX n (E) are equally plausible, then the converse does hold.
Proposition 5.7: Suppose PI is a qualitative Markovian measure consistent with some set C of constraints, E is a time-n event, and A <;;; S. If all the n-prefixes in (i.e., the ones that are subsets of) MAY' (E) are equivalent, then MAX' (E) <; A( n ) if and only if A E Bef' (E).
Example 5.8: We now examine the setup of Example 4.3 using partially specified transition plausibilities. To cap ture our intuition that changes are unlikely, we require that specification, in general, does not guarantee that one expla nation is preferred to the other. I
We note that we can use the procedure described above to maintain an estimate of the agents beliefs at each time point. This involves using the Markovian-plausibility space Pl. of Theorem 5.5. We discuss the details in the full paper.
RELATED WORK
We now briefly compare our approach to others in the liter ature.
Markovian belief change provides an approach for dealing with sequences of observations. Iterated belief revision, which also deals with sequences of observations, has been the focus of much recent attention (see [Lehmann 1995] and the references therein). Conditioning a prior plausi bility measure provides a general approach to dealing with iterated belief revision. By using conditioning, we are im plicitly assuming that the observations made provide correct info rmation about the world. We cannot condition on an inconsistent sequence of observations. This assumption al lows us to avoid some of the most problematic aspects of belief revision, and focus our attention instead on putting additionaJ structure into the prior, so as to be able to express in a straightforward way natural notions of belief change.
One of the goals of Markovian belief change is to be able to combine aspects of revision and update. Finally, we note that the Markov assumption has been used extensively in the literature on probabilistic reasoning about action. Papers on this topic typically represent situations using dynamic belie/networks [Dean and Kanazawa 1989) .
Dynamic belief networks are essentially Markov chains with additional structure on states: A state is assumed to be characterized by the vaJues of a number of variables. The probability of a transition is described by a belief network.
Belief networks allow us to express more independence as sumptions than just those characterizing Markovian prob abilities. For example, using a belief network, we can state that the value of variable x2 at time n + 1 is inde pendent of the value of X 1 at time n given the value of X2 at time n. Darwiche [1992] showed how qualitative Bayesian networks could be captured in his framework; it should be straightforward to add such structure to the plau sibility framework as well, once we restrict to structured plausibility spaces. 
DISCUSSION

